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NOTES AND COMMENTS 73
passages could just as easily be interpreted to mean that something
more than nearness of existing service to the new region is required.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Ozark Power and Wa-
ter Co. v. Public Service Commission of Mo.13 sustained an order of
the Commission requiring an extension under circumstances very
similar to those in the instant case, but there existed the additional
fact that the company's agents had canvassed the territory for pros-
pective customers and had induced several persons to have their
houses wired in contemplation of receiving the service. It would seem
that some such positive act on the part of the company should be re-
quired before an implied dedication is inferred. The few state courts
which deny the power of public service comminsions to require exten-
sions do not consider the question of implied dedication, but base their
holdings solely upon the proposition contended for by the Power Co.
in the present case, that the right carries no duty.' 4 The question of im-
plied dedication will necessarily remain unanswered until the Supreme
Court of the United States rules squarely on the point.
JAMES W. DOR.SEY.
Taxation-Constitutional Law-State Use Tax.
A recent North Carolina statute1 provides that every purchaser
of a motor vehicle for use in North Carolina must pay a use tax of
three per cent of the purchase price. If the purchaser has paid the North
Carolina sales tax2 the amount exacted under this statute is refunded.
The plaintiff, a resident of North Carolina, purchased an auto-
mobile in Virginia for use in North Carolina. The Commissioner of
Revenue refused to issue him a license until he paid the tax imposed
by the above statute. The plaintiff paid the tax under protest and sued
to recover it contending that the statute under which it was collected
was unconstitutional in that it burdened interstate commerce, was
discriminatory, and further that it violated the provision of the State
Constitution which requires all taxes to be by a uniform rule. The
statute was held to violate neither the Federal nor the State Consti-
tution.3
One of the primary objections urged against a retail sales tax is
that it encourages out of state purchases. To remedy this evil with-
" 287 Mo. 522, 229 S. W. 782 (1921).
"Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Cal., 173 Cal. 577,
160 Pac. 828 (1916); Towers v. United Railways of Baltimore, 126 Md. 478,
95 Atl. 170 (1915); Mays v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 75 S. C. 455, 56 S. E. 30
(1906).
1N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880(156)e(13) ; see Statutory Changes in
North Carolina in 1935 (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 420.N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880(156)e(12).
Powell v. Maxwell, Comm'r. of Revenue, 210 N. C. 211, 186 S. E. 326 (1936).
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out conflicting with the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution
has proved to be an aggravating problem in state legislation. The above
statute represents an attempt by North Carolina to eliminate evasion
of its sales tax by those who go outside the state to purchase automo-
biles.
In 1935 several states, having a retail sales tax, made an attempt to
solve this problem of tax evasion by adopting laws which taxed the
use of personal property within their bounds. 4 Although North Caro-
lina's use tax statute5 is more restricted in its application than the
more general use tax statutes, 6 the same constitutional questions are in-
volved. While a state cannot burden interstate commerce,7 it is well
settled that a state may levy a tax upon the use of property within
the state.8 Since the automobile in the principal case had come to
rest within the state it was no longer a part of interstate commerce and
therefore the tax could not have been a burden upon interstate com-
merce.
Statutes9 similar to the one in the principal case have been held not
to be discriminatory since every purchaser pays the same amount of
tax. The fact that the taxes are levied under different statutes makes
no difference. Related statutes must be construed in conjunction with
the one assailed and final effect rather than form made the test of con-
stitutionality. A state may distribute its tax burden as it sees fit if
the result taken in its totality is within the state's Constitutional
4In 1935 the following states enacted statutes taxing the use of personal
property within their bounds. CAl. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1935) Act 8495a p.
2018; 01o CODE: (Baldwin, Supp. 1936) §5546-26; OKLA. SEss. LAws (Harlow,
1935) Acr. 7, c. 66 §4 (j) ; WAsH. LAWS (1935) Title 4, c. 180 n 726.
'See Note 1, supra.
'See Note 4, supra.
'Kansas Southern Ry. v. Kaw Valley Dist., 233 U. S. 75, 34 Sup. Ct. 564, 58
L. ed. 857 (1914) ; Helson v. Commonwealth of Ky., 279 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct.
279, 73 L. ed. 683 (1929) ; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497, 79
L. ed. 1032 (1935).
'Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 606, 65 L. ed.
1139 (1921); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 49 Sup. Ct. 188, 73
L. ed. 475 (1929) ; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631,
76 L. ed. 1232 (1932); Eastern Air Transport Inc. v. S. C. Tax Comm., 285
U. S. 147, 52 Sup. Ct. 340, 76 L. ed. 673 (1932); Edleman v. Boeing Air
Transport Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 591, 77 L. ed. 1155 (1933) ; Nashville
Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed. 730 (1933) ; Piper
v. Bingaman, 12 F. Supp. 755 (D. N. M. 1935) ; Harper v. England, 168 So. 403
(Fla. 1936).
'Acrs OF S. C. (1930) p. 1390. This statute provides for a license tax of
six cents per gallon upon every person storing or using gasoline within the state.
However, the tax is not applicable if the gasoline has been purchased from a
S. C. dealer who has paid a -tax to deal in gasoline equivalent to the use tax.
WASH. LAws (1935) Title 4, c. 180n. 726. This statute provides for a tax
upon the use of personal property within the state, but does not apply if the pur-
chaser has paid a sales tax.
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power.1 0 The North Carolina use tax 1 does not have the ten dol-
lar maximum which is contained in the retail sales tax.12 However,
the Commissioner of Revenue construed the two to have the same max-
imum. This power was given to him in the revenue act and such con-
struction is prima facie correct.' 3 Therefore the North Carolina Use
Tax statute cannot be assailed as discriminatory.
There are court decisions to the effect that a use tax is not a
property tax and thus not subject to the uniformity provisions of the
state constitutions.14 The North Carolina court has held that a use
tax is not a property tax,15 and while under our court decisions this
would not necessarily exempt it from the uniformity rule, the effect of
the rule is only to require uniformity within each valid classification
made by the legislature. 16 Many practical distinctions between the two
types of taxes suggest themselves. A property tax is collected annually
while a use tax is collected only once. A property tax is due on a cer-
tain date while a use tax is not. And finally the manner of collecting the
two is different.1 7
Thus it seems that the principal case is sound both from a legal
and practical standpoint. This is a progressive attempt on the part of
the state to meet a practical problem in a practical way. It is not an
attempt by the state to erect a barrier to interstate commerce, but
rather an effort by the state to secure the revenue which it justly de-
serves.
CLARENCE W. GRIFFIN.
Torts-Contributory Negligence of Minors-Question
for Court or Jury.
Plaintiff, a boy of 12, while roller skating was injured when hit by
defendant's negligently driven car. He testified that he was unable to
stop when warned of the approaching vehicle by his playmates and that
he "thought that he could make it but missed." He further testified that
he realized that he ought not to have gone into the street. The judge
"Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631, 76 L. ed. 1232
(1932) ; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henniford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14 (1935).
"See Note 1, supra.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880 (156)e(12).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880 (191). The construction of a stat-
ute by its administrative officer carries great weight in the interpretation by a
court. Cannon v. Maxwell, 205 N. C. 420, 171 S. E. 624 (1933); People Park
Reservoir Co. v. Hinderlider, 57 P. (2d) 894 (Colo. 1936).
"Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henniford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14 (1935).
"Stedman v. Winston-Salem, 204 N. C. 203, 167 S. E. 813 (1933),
holding that tangible personal property is one thing and the use thereof another,
and one may be taxed and the other exempt.
"'Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930).
" Forster, Constitutionality of California Use Tax (1936) 9 So. CALin. L.
Rsv. 261.
